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NOTE
Holding on to Clarity: Reconciling the Federal
Kidnapping Statute with the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act
Benjamin Reese*
In recent decades, the international community has come to recognize human
trafficking as a problem of epidemic proportions. Congress responded to this
global crisis in 2000 by passing the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)
and has since supplemented that comprehensive enactment. But, in light of the
widespread use of psychological rather than physical coercion in trafficking
cases, a long-standing split among federal courts regarding the scope of the
federal kidnapping statute raises significant concerns about the United States’
efforts to combat traffickers. In particular, the broad interpretation adopted by
several circuits threatens effective enforcement of statutes designed to prosecute
traffickers, endangers the due process rights of potential defendants, and risks
rendering the criminal provisions of the TVPA superfluous. This Note argues
that those broader interpretations are incorrect as a matter of proper statutory
interpretation, and especially when considered in light of the passage of the
TVPA. It further contends that, in kidnapping-by-deception cases, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant intended to back up the deception
with force or the threat of force if his ruse failed.
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Introduction
Courts have recognized that slavery and involuntary servitude are evolving threats to human rights—likely to morph into forms designed to evade
the letter of the law—at least since the period immediately following the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.1 In the modern world, slavery and
involuntary servitude manifest themselves in the form of human trafficking.2
As commentators and the public alike have become aware over the past decade, the problem of human trafficking “has reached epidemic proportions.”3
Indeed, there are “more people in slavery today than ever before.”4 The 2014
edition of the Walk Free Foundation’s Global Slavery Index estimates that

1. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872) (“The word servitude is
of larger meaning than slavery . . . . It was very well understood that in the form of apprenticeship for long terms . . . or by reducing the slaves to the condition of serfs attached to the
plantation, the purpose of the article might have been evaded, if only the word slavery had
been used.”).
2. Kathleen Kim, Psychological Coercion in the Context of Modern-Day Involuntary Labor: Revisiting United States v. Kozminski and Understanding Human Trafficking, 38 U. Tol. L.
Rev. 941, 941 (2007) (“Human trafficking is synonymous with modern-day slavery according
to legislators, law enforcement, immigrant rights advocates, women’s rights advocates, and the
public at large.”).
3. See, e.g., id. at 955.
4. Slavery Today, Free the Slaves, http://www.freetheslaves.net/about-slavery/slaverytoday/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
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approximately 35.8 million people are held as slaves today,5 which is especially startling when compared to estimates placing the total volume of people sold into slavery during the course of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade
around 12 million.6
Congress responded to this threat in 2000 by passing the Trafficking of
Victims and Violence Protection Act of 2000,7 more commonly known as
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).8 The TVPA combats
human trafficking holistically by providing for the implementation of programs to prevent human trafficking, programs to protect and assist victims,
and provisions focused on the prosecution of human traffickers.9 In particular the TVPA modifies the provisions of the U.S. Code criminalizing forced
labor in order to combat human trafficking.10
But there are also other statutes used to prosecute defendants in trafficking cases.11 The federal kidnapping statute (§ 1201(a)) is one of these independent avenues for prosecution.12
Traffickers often take advantage of members of vulnerable populations
by inducing them into forced labor.13 One attribute that differentiates
human trafficking from other crimes is the frequency with which traffickers
utilize psychological coercion and deception to control their victims, sometimes without any corresponding use of physical force or threats.14 Section
1201(a) requires both a “taking” and a “holding” of a victim.15 Although the
statute clearly contemplates a “taking” by deception, it is not clear whether
continued trickery or falsehood alone is enough to constitute a “holding.”16
As the Second Circuit recently recognized, the question of whether the use
of deception alone would allow for prosecution under § 1201(a)—without
5. Walk Free Found., The Global Slavery Index 2014 5 (2014), http://d3mj66ag90b
5fy.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Global_Slavery_Index_2014_final_lowres.pdf.
The Global Slavery Index defines slavery as “one person possessing or controlling another
person in such as [sic] a way as to significantly deprive that person of their individual liberty,
with the intention of exploiting that person through their use, management, profit, transfer or
disposal.” Id. at 10. The Index views human trafficking as a pseudonym for slavery. Id. at 11.
6. Estimates, Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www
.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces (last visited May 15, 2015).
7. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
8. See id. § 101.
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2012).
11. Kelly E. Hyland, Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American Framework, 17
Berkeley Women’s L.J. 29, 48–49 (2001).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
13. See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 186–198. A “taking” in this context refers to the
process by which a kidnapper gains control of his or her victim; the term “taking” does not
have any Fifth Amendment connotations. A “holding” refers to the manner in which the kidnapper maintains that control. The contours of that definition have long divided the federal
courts. See infra text accompanying note 198.
16. United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 2014).
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the intention to use physical force if psychological coercion fails—has divided the federal circuits.17
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have answered that question in the affirmative.18 The Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, has concluded that the prosecution
must show a willingness to back up the deception, if it were to fail, with the
use of force or threats.19 Complicating matters further, the Fourth Circuit
sometimes appears to agree with the Eleventh Circuit,20 but at other times
proposes an intermediate test requiring only the showing of an opportunity
to use force to back up the deception.21 The resulting confusion has the
potential to derail implementation of the TVPA,22 endangers the due process
rights of defendants,23 and frustrates police attempts to apprehend human
traffickers.24
Moreover, this confusion is compounded by the fact that none of the
circuits have provided any significant interpretive analysis supporting their
readings of § 1201(a). Nor have any of the circuits considered the impact of
their readings on the effort to combat human trafficking. Thus, the overlap
between the TVPA and § 1201(a) will bring an issue that has long divided
federal courts to the forefront in a way that makes its resolution critical to
the United States’ continued efforts to combat trafficking.
This Note fills that void by providing an in-depth inquiry into the
meaning of § 1201(a) and exploring the significance of this issue in the
human trafficking context. It concludes that § 1201(a) requires a demonstrated willingness to use force, and that this interpretation is necessary to
properly align § 1201(a) with the TVPA and provide much-needed clarity to
authorities seeking to combat human trafficking.
Part I discusses the nature and extent of the problem of human trafficking in the United States and Congress’s comprehensive response to it. Part II
explores the current split in authority regarding § 1201(a). Part III argues
that a broad interpretation of § 1201(a) brings it into conflict with the
TVPA and that adopting the interpretation favored by the Eleventh Circuit is
required to reconcile the two statutes. Part IV argues that other traditional
methods of statutory interpretation support this narrower interpretation.

17.
18.
Stands,
225–26
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
United States v. Garza-Robles, 627 F.3d 161, 166–68 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.
105 F.3d 1565, 1576 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d 220,
(5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 50–51 (8th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550, 1555–56 (11th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 313 (4th Cir. 2003).
See United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 202–03 (4th Cir. 2004).
See infra Sections III.B, III.D.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.D.
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I. The Ongoing Effort to Combat Human Trafficking
Increasingly, countries around the world have realized that the problem
of human trafficking has escalated.25 Many nations, including the United
States, have responded with legislative action designed to combat this modern manifestation of slavery.26 But trafficking is notoriously difficult to define27 and even more difficult to combat.28 This Part explores human
trafficking in the United States and the TVPA. Section I.A discusses the extent of human trafficking in the United States. Section I.B details Congress’s
response to this growing criminal enterprise.
A. The Prevalence of Human Trafficking in the United States
Attempts to quantify the number of human trafficking victims—both in
the United States and internationally—have been largely unsuccessful.29
Globally, estimates of those held in modern-day slavery vary; for instance, in
2012, although the International Labor Organization estimated that the
number was approximately 20.9 million people,30 the State Department had
previously reported that the number could fall anywhere between 4 million
and 27 million people.31 These differences could be the result of varying
research methodologies,32 but regardless of the actual number of victims, it
is clear that human trafficking is among the “fastest growing illegal businesses” in the modern world.33
“Like the global figures, estimates of the scope of trafficking in the
United States also vary widely.”34 Estimates have focused almost exclusively
on the prevalence of international trafficking and largely ignored interstate
25. Kim, supra note 2, at 955 (quoting U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, FAQ on Trafficking in Human Beings (Mar. 24, 2007)).
26. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons
22–25 (2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Global_Report_on_TIP
.pdf.
27. Kim, supra note 2, at 960 (“Both international and domestic legal forums have struggled to capture the conceptual complexity of human trafficking in consistent legal definitions
that facilitate the enforcement of human trafficking crimes.”).
28. Prosecution, humantrafficking.org, http://www.humantrafficking.org/combat_
trafficking/prosecution (last visited May 15, 2015).
29. Kim, supra note 2, at 956–57.
30. Int’l Labour Office, ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour 13 (2012), http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—declaration/documents/publication/wcms_
182004.pdf.
31. U.S. Dep’t of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 8 (2007), http://www.state
.gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf.
32. Kim, supra note 2, at 956.
33. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 131, 150 (2003).
34. Kim, supra note 2, at 956.
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trafficking.35 The Department of Health and Human Services suggests that
the best way to assess the scope of the problem domestically is to consider
the number of individuals considered to be at risk of exploitation.36 Although many of these estimates consider only children,37 the numbers are
striking. By one 2002 estimate, between 244,000 and 325,000 young people
were considered to be at risk for sexual exploitation in the United States,38
and for at least some time during 1999, 1.7 million young people were characterized as “runaway or throwaway youth.”39 Likewise, notwithstanding
child labor statutes and the valiant efforts of an understaffed Department of
Labor, many children are likely illegally employed across the United States.40
Unfortunately, studies providing numerical estimates for how many of these
at-risk children are actually trafficked or exploring the size or victimization
of other at-risk groups are few and far between.41
Similarly, the perpetrators of human trafficking are not readily categorized.42 Although large criminal syndicates do orchestrate human trafficking
schemes throughout the world,43 human traffickers in the United States
come in many forms; they include individuals and families who often utilize
larger criminal networks.44 As one might expect, different offenders are
motivated by a diverse range of goals, but profitability 45 and the economic
35. Heather J. Clawson et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Human
Trafficking into and Within the United States: A Review of the Literature 4 (2009),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/humantrafficking/litrev/index.pdf.
36. Id. at 4–7.
37. Id.
38. Richard J. Estes & Neil Alan Weiner, Univ. of Pa., The Commercial Exploitation of Children in the U.S., Canada and Mexico 144 (rev. 2002).
39. Clawson et al., supra note 35, at 5.
40. See id. at 6. In 2004, the department’s Wage and Hours Division reported that 5,840
children were employed in violation of child labor laws. Id. When combined with the fact that
only thirty-four individuals were charged with enforcing those laws, which amounts to about
one for every 95,000 child laborers, this number is striking and suggests that the exploitation
of child labor is very much widespread. Id.
41. Accordingly, the numbers pertaining to at-risk children are provided to give some
statistical context to claims that human trafficking is rampant in the United States, despite the
fact that actual estimates of domestic human trafficking are not available.
42. See LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Note, Global Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing the Success
of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
227, 232–33 (2003).
43. See Global Survival Network, Crime & Servitude: An Exposé of the Traffic
in Women for Prostitution from the Newly Independent States 28 (1997).
44. Amy O’Neill Richard, International Trafficking in Women to the United
States: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime 13 (1999);
Kelly E. Hyland, The Impact of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Hum. Rts. Brief, Winter 2001, at 30, 30.
45. See International Trafficking in Women and Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Near E. & S. Asian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 11 (2000)
(statement of Frank E. Loy, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs); Bimal Ghosh, Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores: Insights into Irregular Migration 32 (1998).
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advantages of a source of labor that is not subject to ordinary workplace
regulation46 are chief among them.
Even though human trafficking is difficult to define because of the vast
differences between perpetrators and the varying goals involved,47
[t]here are similarities across the reported cases which often include little
or no pay for menial and difficult work, debt bondage, confiscated documents such as passports, undocumented immigrant status, long and grueling work hours, as well as threats of harm, physical assault, and emotional
abuse.48

Particularly significant among these commonalities are the “powerful effects
of psychological coercion” that “play a key role in entrapment and continued enslavement” in human trafficking cases.49 When considering the TVPA,
Congress provided a striking description of this sort of manipulation common among trafficking cases:
[For instance, a] nanny is led to believe that children in her care will be
harmed if she leaves the home. In other cases, a scheme, plan, or pattern
intended to cause a belief of serious harm may refer to intentionally causing the victim to believe that her family will face harms such as banishment, starvation, or bankruptcy in their home country.50

In such cases, “there may be no visible signs of physical restraint” and the
constraints imposed on the worker’s freedom may be very difficult to
identify.51
Moreover, “[t]rafficked persons are often in a precarious life situation in
their country of origin,”52 which makes them especially susceptible to common types of psychological coercion employed by traffickers, such as suggestions of deportation.53 For instance, in 2001 two individuals lured three
impoverished Jamaican men to the individuals’ tree farm in New Hampshire
with promises of lucrative employment.54 Once they arrived, the men’s
46. Compare Sheila Neville & Susana Martinez, The Law of Human Trafficking: What
Legal Aid Providers Should Know, 37 Clearinghouse Rev. 551, 554 (2004) (“[T]raffickers
maximize their profits by keeping their costs low. . . . Victims are usually forced to work long
hours, sometimes every day, for little or no pay.”), with 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (establishing a
minimum wage), and id. at § 207 (establishing a limit on the maximum number of hours
employees can work).
47. Kim, supra note 2, at 955–60.
48. T.K. Logan et al., Understanding Human Trafficking in the United States, 10 Trauma,
Violence & Abuse 3, 4 (2009).
49. Id.
50. H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
51. Kim, supra note 2, at 942. Of course, many human traffickers do use physical force.
This Note does not claim otherwise, despite its focus on trafficking that does not involve such
force.
52. Id. at 958.
53. See id. at 958–60.
54. United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 149 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 1101
(2005). Prior to recruiting the three victims in this case, the two defendants had abused two
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travel documents were confiscated and they were told tales of a similar
worker who would be “destroy[ed]” because he ran away.55 Although the
men were physically free to travel around the neighborhood unaccompanied, they were forced to work on the tree farm through psychological coercion and fear.56 As this case illustrates, “[t]raffickers prey on those with few
economic opportunities and those struggling to meet basic needs,” who
often share characteristics like “poverty, young age, limited education, lack
of work opportunities, lack of family support . . . , history of previous sexual
abuse, health or mental health challenges, [etc.].”57 Although these examples
focus on international trafficking victims, domestic trafficking victims are
often targeted for similar reasons.58
Drawing on these similarities—namely, the use of psychological coercion, sometimes accompanied by physical force, and the vulnerability of victim populations—the United Nations defines human trafficking as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.59

This definition recognizes the broad range of tactics traffickers utilize to
control their victims. Congress has adopted a similarly capacious definition
in the TVPA:
The term “severe forms of trafficking in persons” means (A) sex trafficking
in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in
which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of
age; or (B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage,
debt bondage, or slavery.60

other Jamaican men they had lured to the United States. Id. at 148. One of these men fled and
the other returned to Jamaica after his visa expired. Id.
55. Id. at 149.
56. Id.
57. Clawson et al., supra note 35, at 7.
58. See infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text.
59. G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime (Jan. 8, 2001), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res
_55/res5525e.pdf.
60. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2012).
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As the next Section details, this broad definition of trafficking is part of a
comprehensive congressional effort to combat human trafficking in the
United States.
B. The Passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
The United States was one of the earliest countries to comprehensively
address human trafficking.61 President Clinton signed the TVPA into law on
October 28, 2000, in the waning days of his administration.62 The TVPA
enjoyed broad bipartisan support in both houses of Congress and passed by
a vote of 371-1 in the House and 95-0 in the Senate.63 The Act both (1)
created a comprehensive scheme for responding to the many facets of the
human trafficking problem, and (2) assuaged due process concerns that prevented existing statutes from effectively responding to the psychological coercion frequently present in trafficking cases.
1. The TVPA was Designed to Provide a Comprehensive Response
to Human Trafficking
The TVPA is a broad, thorough, and comprehensive effort to provide a
coherent means of combating human trafficking. The Act’s three parts focus
on the prevention of human trafficking, the protection of and assistance to
of victims, and the prosecution and punishment of traffickers.64
The TVPA directs the President to establish programs to help prevent
human trafficking.65 The Act places a heavy emphasis on promoting public
awareness of the dangers of trafficking and available protections.66 Subsequent amendments have added to these TVPA programs. For instance, in
2003 Congress added provisions for the support of border interdiction
programs,67 and in 2008, Congress gave the President authority to provide
61. See Hyland, supra note 11, at 30–31.
62. Presidential Statement on Signing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres Doc. (Oct. 28, 2000), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
WCPD-2000-11-06/pdf/WCPD-2000-11-06-Pg2662.pdf.
63. Hyland, supra note 11, at 61.
64. Id. at 62; see also Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 Mich.
J. Int’l L. 1143, 1159–60 (2003).
65. 22 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2012); Hyland, supra note 11, at 62. Congress suggests several
avenues for addressing the trafficking issue, including: “microcredit lending programs, training
in business development, skills training, and job counseling,” “programs to promote women’s
participation in economic decisionmaking,” “programs to keep children, especially girls, in
elementary and secondary schools, and to educate persons who have been victims of trafficking,” “development of educational curricula regarding the dangers of trafficking,” and “grants
to nongovernmental organizations to accelerate and advance the political, economic, social,
and educational roles and capacities of women in their countries.” 22 U.S.C. § 7104(a).
66. 22 U.S.C. § 7104(b).
67. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, §3,
117 Stat. 2875, 2875–77 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7104(c)).
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technical assistance to expand the capacity of foreign governments to cope
with human trafficking.68
The TVPA also takes major steps to protect and assist victims of human
trafficking.69 First, the Act directs the Department of State and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) to “establish and carry out
programs and initiatives in foreign countries to assist in the safe integration,
reintegration, or resettlement, as appropriate, of victims of trafficking.”70
Second, Congress “increased protections for refugees and internally displaced persons,” in coordination with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to prevent their exploitation by human
traffickers.71 Third, the TVPA “affords assistance to trafficking victims in the
United States regardless of immigration status,” which clears the way for
them to obtain compensation and services from the Crime Victims Fund.72
Fourth, it authorizes the Department of Justice to make grants to states,
Indian tribes, units of local government, and nonprofits or NGOs “to develop, expand, or strengthen victim service programs for victims of trafficking.”73 And finally, the TVPA mandates that, by 180 days after its passage,
federal agencies had to promulgate regulations to ensure that trafficking victims in the custody of the federal government “not be detained in facilities
inappropriate to their status as crime victims,” “receive necessary medical
care and other assistance,” and receive protection if their “safety is at risk or
there is danger of additional harm by recapture.”74
Most significantly for the purposes of this Note, the TVPA provides for
criminal prosecution of human traffickers by creating several new offenses
and modifying others.75 Of particular relevance are the changes the Act
68. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, §103, 122 Stat. 5044, 5046 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7104(i)).
Forms of authorized technical assistance include efforts to expand the capacity of foreign governments to do the following: (1) investigate private entities that might be exploiting victims,
(2) provide information to members of their public, (3) ensure that workers are being adequately protected, and (4) conduct census-like registrations of vulnerable populations. Id.
69. Hyland, supra note 11, at 62–63.
70. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1). In 2003, 2006, and 2008 Congress expanded on the requirements for Department of State and USAID programs, directing that these programs must (to
the maximum extent practicable) provide “[s]upport for nongovernmental organizations and
advocates to provide legal, social, and other services and assistance” to trafficking victims, id.
§ 7105(a)(1)(B), and “[e]ducation and training for trafficked women and girls,” id. § 7105
(a)(1)(C).
71. Id. § 7105(a)(1)(F).
72. Hyland, supra note 11, at 63.
73. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(2)(A).
74. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c). The Act also provided for the issuance of a T visa for some
trafficking victims, Hyland, supra note 11, at 65, and took several other steps to help protect
trafficking victims. For a full catalog of the original provisions of the Act, see id. Those interested in learning how these provisions have been supplemented or altered in the interim
(though not in ways that substantively affect the portions of the Act discussed above) can
review the current codification of these portions of the TVPA at 22 U.S.C. § 7105.
75. Hyland, supra note 11, at 65–66.
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made to § 1589 of Chapter 18 of the U.S. Code, which prohibits the use or
provision of forced labor. The Act expanded the standard penalty for violations from ten years to twenty years in prison and allowed for a life sentence
if one of several aggravating factors, such as kidnapping or the death of a
victim, is present.76 The Act’s criminal provisions, both as adopted and as
amended, thus mirror the comprehensive nature of its other sections devoted to prevention and victim services.77 But the TVPA did more than simply modify § 1589 to combat human trafficking. It also sought to address
the due process concerns raised by the prosecution of deception-based
forced labor that the Supreme Court raised in the late 1980s.
2. The TVPA Resolved Preexisting Due Process Concerns Surrounding
the Criminalization of Deception-Based Forced Labor
In the early 1980s, conflicting circuit decisions created confusion regarding the meaning of the federal prohibition on involuntary servitude
(§ 1584), which reads: “Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude . . . any other person for any term . . . shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”78 The Second Circuit
had previously concluded that psychological coercion or deception alone
was not sufficient to constitute a “holding to involuntary servitude,” and
instead held that a threat of physical or legal force was necessary.79 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that “[a] holding in involuntary servitude occurs when an individual coerces another into his service by improper
or wrongful conduct that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other
person to believe that he or she has no alternative but to perform the labor,”
regardless of whether that conduct is a threat of physical or legal force or
psychological coercion.80
Four years later, in United States v. Kozminski, the Supreme Court sided
with the Second Circuit.81 In reaching this result, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on the history of § 1584 itself,82 and that analysis is not necessarily
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(d) (2012); Hyland, supra note 11, at 65.
77. The TVPA also contained several additional enforcement-related directives. For instance, the Act created “an Interagency Task Force to monitor and combat trafficking in persons . . . [by] coordinating the implementation of the legislation; facilitating cooperative
international efforts for prevention, prosecution, and reintegration; and expanding interagency data collection and research.” Hyland, supra note 11, at 66. Additionally, “as an additional enforcement measure, the [TVPA] devotes three sections to the application of
international sanctions.” Id. at 67.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1584(a).
79. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 480, 487 (2d Cir. 1964).
80. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated by United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
81. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (concluding that a holding to involuntary servitude requires the use or threat of physical or legal force).
82. Id. at 944–48.
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applicable to § 1201(a). But, the Kozminski Court’s analysis is highly relevant in several other respects. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the majority
expressed a deep concern that the broader interpretation of § 1584 favored
by the government
would appear to criminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity; would
delegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type of coercive activities are so morally reprehensible that
they should be punished as crimes; would subject individuals to the risk of
arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and conviction. . . . Moreover, as the
Government would interpret the statutes, the type of coercion prohibited
would depend entirely upon the victim’s state of mind. Under such a view,
the statutes would provide almost no objective indication of the conduct or
condition they prohibit, and thus would fail to provide fair notice to ordinary people who are required to conform their conduct to the law.83

As this Note discusses below, these are precisely the same concerns created
by the Eighth and Fifth Circuits’ interpretation of § 1201(a) as well as the
standard articulated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Lentz.84
This concern does not mean that psychological coercion of the type that
is common in human trafficking settings could never be criminalized, a fact
explicitly recognized by the Kozminski Court’s invitation to Congress to
change § 1584.85 The TVPA, as originally enacted, did just that. It allows
prosecution even when traffickers do not threaten physical violence or the
abuse of legal process,86 such as reporting illegal immigrants who refuse to
comply to the authorities. Indeed, Congress’s motivation in explicitly defining “serious harm” to include psychological coercion in the TVPA was to
prevent Kozminski’s application in the human trafficking context.87 In 2008
Congress added a definition of “serious harm” to further clarify this point:
The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a
reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances
to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid
incurring that harm.88

These changes are significant, not only because they overturn Kozminski in
the context of § 1589 prosecutions, but also because they seek to address the
Court’s due process concerns. They provide a standard that reduces the
chance of arbitrary enforcement and excludes innocent conduct in a way
that the naked word “hold” in the original forced labor statute did not. The
83. Id. at 949–50 (emphases added).
84. See infra Section III.C.
85. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
86. Kim, supra note 2, at 963–65.
87. H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.); see also 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(13)
(2012) (congressional findings of TVPA); Kim, supra note 2, at 963–64.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2012).
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Kozminski Court’s concerns—and, as discussed in Section III.C, those concerns surrounding § 1201(a)—are not implicated to the same extent when
Congress has provided a standard by which the public can measure the degree of psychological coercion or deception that has been criminalized.89
Congress has done so in the TVPA.90 On the other hand, a broad and largely
unexplained judicial interpretation of a statute that lacks the TVPA’s clear
guidance regarding psychological coercion powerfully emphasized the concerns articulated in Kozminski.91
***
These aspects of the TVPA—its comprehensiveness and efforts to address the concerns raised by the Kozminski Court—when coupled with the
major role deception plays in human trafficking directly implicate the longstanding split between the circuits regarding the meaning of “hold” in
§ 1201(a). As the next two Parts reveal, the inherent contradiction between
the broad approach taken by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and these critical
functions of the TVPA provides compelling support for the Eleventh Circuit’s narrower interpretation. The intermediate approach of the Fourth Circuit creates contradictions similar to the broad approaches.
II. Varying Circuit Interpretations Create Deeply Troubling
Ambiguity Surrounding § 1201(a)’s “Hold” Requirement
Before Part III considers how conflict with the TVPA bears on the resolution of the confusion surrounding the meaning of “hold” as used in
§ 1201(a), this Part describes the split in authority causing the ambiguity.
This Part argues that the approaches taken by the courts of appeals in kidnapping-by-deception cases are not compatible with each other, and have
not been for some time, despite the failure of most circuits to recognize the
split or provide any significant rationale supporting their chosen approach.
The Supreme Court has only addressed the meaning of § 1201(a) once.
In Chatwin v. United States, Chatwin (a sixty-eight-year-old widower) employed a fifteen-year-old girl as a housekeeper at his home in Utah where he
and another individual convinced her that “plural” or “celestial” marriage
was a true expression of the Mormon faith.92 The girl was eventually converted to Chatwin’s way of thinking and entered a “celestial” marriage with
him, after which she became pregnant.93 When the girl’s parents learned of
this they notified the authorities, who took her into custody.94 Chatwin and
89. Cf. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949–52 (inviting Congress to define “holding” to involuntary servitude to include psychological coercion).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2).
91. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949–52.
92. 326 U.S. 455, 457 (1946). Moreover, there was evidence that the girl had a mental age
of only seven. Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 457.
93. Id. at 457–58.
94. Id. at 458.
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two codefendants then convinced the girl that she should abide “by the law
of God” and run away with them to Mexico; she assented and went to Mexico with the men, where she and Chatwin participated in a civil marriage
ceremony.95 The girl was then brought back to the United States and lived
with Chatwin in Arizona for over two years before federal authorities discovered her.96 Chatwin was convicted of kidnapping, but the Supreme Court
reversed his conviction.97
The Chatwin Court explained that “[t]he act of holding a kidnaped person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an unlawful physical or
mental restraint for an appreciable period against the person’s will and with
a willful intent so to confine the victim.”98 In concluding that Chatwin’s
conduct did not fall within the statute, the Court emphasized that there was
no proof that Chatwin “imposed at any time an unlawful physical or mental
restraint,” that “[n]othing indicate[d] that she was deprived of her liberty,”
that the girl was “perfectly free to leave,” and that “[t]here [was] no proof
that Chatwin or any of the other petitioners willfully intended through
force, fear or deception to confine the girl against her desires.”99 Thus,
Chatwin definitively established that a kidnapping conviction cannot stand
when a victim accompanies the defendant voluntarily. On the other hand,
the Court’s language also implies that when a defendant uses “deception,” a
kidnapping conviction is permissible.100
Because Chatwin implicitly recognizes the possibility of “kidnapping by
deception” but does not explain what is sufficient for prosecution, it provides little guidance to lower courts determining when deception rises to the
level of kidnapping. This has led to widespread confusion among the
circuits.
As the Second Circuit recognized in United States v. Corbett in April
2014, there is a longstanding split in authority regarding the meaning of the
word “hold” in § 1201(a),101 which reads:
[w]hoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts,
or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person,
except in the case of a minor by the parents thereof, when [inter alia] (1)
the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce . . .
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life and, if
the death of any person results, shall be punished by death or life
imprisonment.102
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 459–61, 465.
98. Id. at 460.
99. Id. (emphases added).
100. See supra text accompanying note 99.
101. 750 F.3d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 2014).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) (emphasis added). The “inter alia” here signals the omission of the plethora of jurisdictional hooks besides transportation in interstate or foreign commerce that have been added to § 1201(a) since its adoption in order to expand the number of
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The Second Circuit explained that § 1201(a) “plainly reaches a defendant
who ‘seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away’ his
victim by deceit . . . [, but l]ess clear is whether [section 1201(a)] covers a
defendant who continues to use trickery to ‘hold’ his victim captive, without
resorting to physical or psychological coercion.”103
The Eleventh Circuit, relying heavily on Chatwin, requires intent to use
or threaten force in addition to deception in order to demonstrate the
“holding” necessary to obtain a conviction. For instance, in United States v.
Boone, Samuel Boone met with Jonathan Wood and, after an afternoon of
alcohol and drug use, induced Wood to travel with him to Georgia by falsely
telling him of a marijuana patch there.104 Boone drove with Wood to a secluded area, where they entered the woods.105 When Wood discovered he
had been deceived, Boone stabbed Wood twice and slit his throat before
leaving him to die.106 Boone was convicted of kidnapping on May 7, 1991,
but appealed on the grounds that Wood’s choice to travel with him had been
entirely voluntary.107 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this challenge, but it held
that “[t]o determine whether a kidnapping by inveiglement has occurred
prior to transportation, a fact finder must ascertain whether the alleged kidnapper had the willingness and intent to use physical or psychological force to
complete the kidnapping in the event that his deception failed.”108
In contrast, several circuits do not appear to require any showing of
intent to resort to physical or psychological force if the defendant’s deception fails to maintain control of the intended victim. For instance, in United
States v. Hoog, the Eighth Circuit upheld a kidnapping conviction. In that
case, Hoog and his son lured several women into a car on different occasions
under the pretext of transporting them to a job interview before taking them
to isolated locations and sexually assaulting them.109 In so doing, the Hoog
Court made no mention of any willingness on the part of the defendants to
back up this deception by force, concluding only that: “[o]nce they had accepted a ride, Hoog or Mills lured or enticed each of [the women]—again by
kidnapping cases that fall within federal jurisdiction. See id. § 1201(a)(1)–(5). Such additional
hooks include performance of such an act within the maritime jurisdiction of the United
States, id. § 1201(a)(2), within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States, id.
§ 1201(a)(3), against the person of a foreign official, internationally protected person, or official guest, id. § 1201(a)(4), or against officers or employees of the federal government, id.
§ 1201(a)(5).
103. Corbett, 750 F.3d at 251.
104. 959 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1992).
105. Boone, 959 F.2d at 1552–53.
106. Id. at 1553.
107. Id. at 1554, 1556–57.
108. Id. at 1555 (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit later re-emphasized this requirement, stating “[w]here an inveiglement occurs and force is held in reserve only because the
kidnapper’s deception is operating successfully, an unlawful interference with the actions of another has occurred . . . such that a kidnapping and holding has occurred under the statute.” Id.
at 1556 (emphasis added).
109. 504 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1974).
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false promises—to stay in the vehicle during its roundabout course into
Kansas[; t]he complaining witnesses were manifestly ‘inveigled’ or ‘decoyed’
into accepting rides within the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).”110
Conspicuously absent from this discussion is any requirement that the prosecution prove that either Hoog or his son intended to use or threaten force if
the deception failed.111
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit does not require a specific intent to use or
threaten force. For instance, Ramiro Carrion-Caliz, after transporting several
Guatemalan immigrants into the United States illegally, persuaded them to
remain in a house in Texas by convincing the immigrants that they would be
captured and deported if they left.112 He then attempted to extort ransom
money from the immigrants’ family, claiming that he was holding them hostage and that they would disappear if his ransom demands were not met.113
In recognizing that psychological deception was sufficient to constitute a
holding, the Fifth Circuit’s decision—using § 1201(a) to interpret the Hostage Taking Act—emphasized that
kidnapping convictions have been meted out to kidnappers who deceive
their victims into accompanying them, or into remaining with them. . . .
[t]he Government need not show that Carrion [sic] physically restrained or
confined [his victims], or that he threatened them with physical force or
violence. It is enough that he frightened or deceived them sufficiently to cause
them to remain in his house when they would have preferred to join [a
relative] in Miami.114

Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit seems to have split with itself on this
issue. In 2003, the Fourth Circuit appeared to follow the lead of the Eleventh
Circuit, concluding that the evidence against a defendant charged with kidnapping was sufficient to show that he “at least was prepared to confine [his

110. Hoog, 504 F.2d at 51.
111. Similarly, in 1997, when the Eighth Circuit again considered a kidnapping-by-deception case, it reached a similar result. United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565 (8th Cir. 1997). In
this case, Phillip Stands lured Gary Torrez to an isolated location on a Native American reservation to view “ancestral lands” before assaulting him. Id. at 1568–70. In affirming Stands’
conviction for kidnapping, the court stated that “[Stands] encouraged Torrez to get into and
remain in the car when he might otherwise have wished to go on his way. . . . We believe the
evidence is more than sufficient to support the government’s contention that Phillip inveigled
or decoyed Torrez into joining the group.” Id. at 1576. The court did not mention a willingness to back up this deception with force or threats.
112. United States v. Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 1991).
113. Id. at 222.
114. Id. at 225–26 (emphases added) (footnote omitted). The Fifth Circuit has adopted
this line of reasoning on at least one other occasion. See United States v. Garza-Robles, 627
F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[F]ear or deception [ ] can be sufficient to restrain a person
against [his] will.” (third alteration in original) (quoting Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d at 225)).
Garza-Robles made no mention of an intent to use force if necessary element, but concluded
that the government’s deception-only theory was not supported by the evidence in this instance. Id.
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victims] at gunpoint if necessary.”115 But, the Fourth Circuit has not been
consistent in its application of this standard; at times it appears to adopt an
intermediate approach. For example, in United States v. Lentz, the government alleged that a defendant had lured his ex-wife to his house in order to
kill her by telling her that she could pick their child up at his residence.116
The Fourth Circuit held that a jury could reasonably find a “holding” of the
victim, because “[f]rom the moment [the ex-wife] pulled up at [the defendant]’s home, she was in his company and no longer ‘perfectly free to leave’
. . . . Rather [the defendant] was then in a position to confine her physically if
necessary.”117 Lentz thus suggested that the prosecution need not show that a
defendant intended to back up a failed deception by physical force or threats,
but merely that he had the opportunity to do so.
Thus, as the Second Circuit explicitly recognized in Corbett, current case
law does not make clear what exactly must be proven in kidnapping-bydeception cases. The Eleventh Circuit, and perhaps the Fourth Circuit under
its reasoning in Higgs, seem to require proof of a specific intent to back up—
with threats or actual physical force—a deception used to lure victims into
accompanying the defendant.118 The Eighth and Fifth Circuits, to the contrary, appear to allow a “holding” entirely by deception without any additional showing of intent. Finally, and in contrast to Higgs, the Fourth
Circuit’s reasoning in Lentz suggests an intermediate approach requiring
only the “opportunity” to use force.
115. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 313 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.
Boone, 959 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1992)). In Higgs, the defendants lured several young
women into a van under the pretext of driving them home, took them to a secluded location,
and murdered them. Id. at 289–90. Higgs appealed his kidnapping convictions, arguing that
the victims voluntarily decided to enter the van and travel with the defendants. Id. at 313.
116. United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 196–98 (4th Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 202–03 (emphasis added) (quoting Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460
(1946)). The Fourth Circuit also concluded that the jury could have inferred a brief holding
prior to the murder once the ex-wife had entered the defendant’s house. Id. at 203. The Lentz
Court declined to consider the government’s argument that the ex-wife was held by deception
during her solo car ride between Virginia and Maryland. Id. at 205 n.3.
118. “Specific intent,” as opposed to “general intent,” is a term that frequently causes
confusion among both lawyers and law students. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 10.06 (6th ed. 2012). As used in this Note, a “specific intent offense” is one
in which the definition of the crime expressly: (1) includes an intent or purpose to do
some future act, or to achieve some further consequence (i.e., a special motive for the
conduct), beyond the conduct or result that constitutes the actus reus for the offense; or
(2) provides that the actor must be aware of a statutory attendant circumstance.

Id.; accord Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.2 (5th ed. 2010). In this instance, beyond the
general intent to induce the victim into accompanying him by deception, the Eleventh Circuit
appeared to require an additional intent to back up that deception by force or threats. This
resembles statutes that require intent to achieve a particular goal in addition to intent to commit the actus reus of an offense (e.g. definitions of burglary which require both an intentional
breaking and entering as well as an intent to commit a felony inside). See Dressler, supra,
§§ 10.06, 12.03. Accordingly, this Note refers to the additional element required by the Eleventh Circuit as a “specific intent” element.
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***
None of these courts have provided any significant reasoning to justify
their interpretations of § 1201(a) and none have considered the broader implications of their interpretations, particularly in the human trafficking context. At best, these divided circuits create confusion as to the burden the
government must bear in kidnapping prosecutions; at worst, the opinions
are entirely contradictory. As Part III demonstrates, reconciling § 1201(a)
with the TVPA provides a way to clarify the prosecution’s burden in
§ 1201(a) prosecutions.
III. A Narrower Interpretation of the “Hold” Requirement is
Necessary to Reconcile § 1201(a) with the TVPA
This Part argues that, given the two central aspects of the TVPA discussed in Section I.B, the broad interpretation of § 1201(a) adopted by the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits inherently frustrates the TVPA’s proper function.
Thus, reconciling § 1201(a) with the TVPA requires adopting the Eleventh
Circuit’s narrow construction. Section III.A demonstrates that the broad
construction of § 1201(a) renders a portion of the TVPA superfluous. Section III.B argues that a broad construction also dilutes the moral force of the
TVPA. Section III.C suggests that reading § 1201(a) broadly implicates the
precise due process concerns Congress sought to avoid in human trafficking
prosecutions when it amended § 1589. And finally, Section III.D explains
that ambiguity in the federal statutes designed and used to combat human
trafficking has been recognized as a threat to the successful apprehension
and prosecution of traffickers.119 Although Section III.D does not bear directly on how that ambiguity should be resolved, it is relevant here because it
emphasizes why a resolution is urgently needed.
A. A Broad Interpretation of § 1201(a) Renders a Portion
of the TVPA Superfluous
Courts “generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts.”120 “Hence laws dealing with
the same subject—being in pari materia . . . —should if possible be interpreted harmoniously.”121 Thus, where possible, the provisions of Title 18 of
the U.S. Code (setting forth all federal criminal offenses) should be read as a
coherent whole.122 This is true even though it means that a later statute may
affect the meaning of an earlier statute, so long as the earlier statute has not
119. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 2, at 969–72.
120. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988).
121. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 252 (2012); see also Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
Colum. L. Rev. 527, 539 (1947).
122. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 254 (citing United States v. Ressam, 553
U.S. 272 (2008)).
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already been given an authoritative judicial interpretation on the point at
issue.123
As discussed above, one portion of the TVPA creates criminal sanctions
for those who engage in human trafficking.124 Among those is § 1589, which
provides
Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person
by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means—(1) by
means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical
restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or
threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of
the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of
any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if
that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another
person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint, shall be . . . fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results . . . or if the violation includes kidnaping . . . the defendant shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.125

In contrast to § 1201(a), which allows punishment regardless of the defendant’s purpose,126 § 1589 requires that the defendant’s action be motivated by a desire to provide or obtain labor or services. The section also
explicitly increases punishment if a kidnapping is involved, suggesting that at
least some cases could not be considered kidnapping. Finally, subsection (c)
of § 1589 includes “psychological, financial, or reputational harm” in the
definition of “serious harm.”127 The TVPA thus explicitly recognizes the sort
of psychological deception that was previously discussed in the context of
§ 1201(a).
But the broad reading of § 1201(a) proposed by the Eighth and Fifth
Circuits and the intermediate approach of the Fourth Circuit would render
this statute superfluous in a large number of human trafficking cases.128 Because these interpretations do not require that the defendant be willing to
use force, any deception would be sufficient to allow prosecutors to charge
under both statutes, or perhaps even ignore § 1589 entirely.129 After all, few
prosecutors would elect to proceed under § 1589, which provides only a

123. Id. at 254–55.
124. Hyland, supra note 11, at 65–66.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a), (d) (2012).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (criminalizing kidnapping when the defendant “holds for ransom or reward or otherwise” (emphasis added)).
127. 18 U.S.C. §1589(c)(2) (emphasis added).
128. There are human trafficking cases in which force is used, but none of § 1201(a)’s
jurisdictional hooks are implicated; in such cases, § 1201(a) and § 1589 clearly do not overlap.
But, given the highly mobile nature of most trafficking operations, and the movement frequently necessary even in smaller operations, these cases are likely to be few and far between.
129. See infra Section IV.A.
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twenty-year maximum in most cases,130 when they could proceed under
§ 1201(a) and bargain with a guaranteed maximum of life in prison. Moreover, § 1201(a) contains no “purpose” limitation, another feature that might
make it more attractive to prosecutors.
It makes little sense for Congress to have included a higher penalty for
forced labor involving a kidnapping if nearly every incidence of forced labor
could be considered a kidnapping. Crossing state lines with a victim or happening to trigger one of the other jurisdictional hooks contained in
§ 1201(a), perhaps by blind (bad) luck, seems like a very odd reason to allow
the imposition of a life sentence. Yet under the interpretations favored by the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits and the Fourth Circuit in Lentz, only cases without
such a hook would preclude a kidnapping charge, since only deception131
and not any specific intent is required in these jurisdictions.
Thus, a broad reading of § 1201(a) tempts prosecutors to ignore Congress’s chosen means of punishing human traffickers (§ 1589) by providing
a more attractive avenue to obtain conviction (§ 1201(a)). A broad interpretation of § 1201(a) encourages prosecutors to pursue the more severe kidnapping charge rather than proceed under the framework of the TVPA.
Indeed, the breathtaking scope of § 1201(a) writ large (as suggested by the
Eighth and Fifth Circuits) would render the TVPA’s criminal provisions superfluous in any case in which the prosecution could find a jurisdictional
hook.132
That the interpretation of § 1201(a) favored by the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits could render § 1589 largely superfluous in the vast majority of cases
militates strongly in favor of the narrow construction the Eleventh Circuit
adopted.133 After all, if the rule against surplusage134 leads courts to read
statutes to avoid depriving a single word of meaning, it hardly makes sense
that they would read a statute to render an entire section of the U.S. Code
redundant.
B. A Broad Interpretation of Section 1201(a) Dilutes the
Moral Force of the TVPA
As Professor Uhlmann argues, criminal laws are not just about retribution or rehabilitation, they also have moral force:135 “Criminal prosecution
130. Unless, of course, he could prove that a kidnapping occurred in addition to forced
labor; alternatively, the prosecutor guarantees the availability of a life sentence (without any
additional proof) by charging under § 1201(a) in the first place.
131. The Lentz standard also requires the “opportunity to use force,” but that requirement
really amounts to nothing more than a presence requirement, and not a very clear one at that.
132. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing the jurisdictional hooks present in § 1201(a)); see also supra Section III.A (describing the reasons why the statute does not
give the federal government plenary jurisdiction over all kidnapping cases).
133. See supra Part II.
134. See infra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.
135. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1295, 1335–36 (2013).
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has a stigmatizing effect that civil enforcement does not. . . . When we
criminalize conduct, we make clear that it is outside the bounds of acceptable conduct in our society.”136 Adopting a broad interpretation of
§ 1201(a)137 dilutes the moral force of the TVPA by undermining congressional judgments about the relative culpability of different subsets of traffickers and by encouraging prosecutors to use it only as a superfluous,
secondary charge.
Just as rendering conduct criminal in the first place sends a message that
conduct is immoral and impermissible in a civilized society, the level of
punishment attached to a criminal conviction expresses a moral judgment.138 It expresses our collective view as to the level of condemnation a
given act deserves. The moral judgment component explains why we do not
levy the same punishment on a thief as we do a murderer. Moreover, it is
Congress that bears primary responsibility for determining which punishments are proportional and which are not,139 because the legislature, not the
courts, best reflects societal judgments about culpability.140
In the TVPA, Congress chose to utilize § 1589 to punish traffickers and
to magnify sentences only in a certain subset of cases, namely those involving a death or kidnapping.141 This decision clearly reflects a congressional
determination that those cases are particularly heinous and cry out for a
particularly severe punishment: the possibility of life in prison. But the interpretation of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, and the Lentz standard, would
undo this determination by allowing the possibility of a life sentence under
§ 1201(a) in nearly every human trafficking prosecution.142 Thus, failing to
require the willingness to use force or threats in kidnapping prosecutions is
a judicial end run around the moral judgments about culpability reflected in
the TVPA. Section 1589 considers every act of human trafficking to be reprehensible and criminal, but it does not consider them to be equally so; the
136. Id. at 1336.
137. This includes the “intermediate approach” favored by the Fourth Circuit.
138. Proportionality between crime and punishment is a fundamental principle of justice
dating back to time immemorial. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Leviticus 24:19–20 (St. Joseph) (“Anyone who inflicts an injury on his neighbor shall receive the
same in return. Limb for limb, eye for eye, tooth for tooth! The same injury that a man gives
another shall be inflicted on him in return.”); Hammurabi, The Code of Hammurabi (L.W.
King trans., Yale L. Sch.: Avalon Proj. 1915) (1780 B.C.E.), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/hammenu.asp. But see Matthew 5:38–39 (St. Joseph) (“You have heard that it was
said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, offer no resistance to one
who is evil. When someone strikes you on (your) right cheek, turn the other one to him as
well.”).
139. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25–28 (2003) (plurality opinion); cf. Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.).
140. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 26. The courts may intervene only in the exceedingly rare case
that a sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to the offense charged. See Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 286–90 (1983).
141. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589(d) (2012).
142. See supra Section III.A.

296

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:275

courts should not adopt a judicial interpretation that disrupts this clearly
expressed congressional determination that not all human traffickers deserve
to face life in prison.143
Furthermore, given the comprehensive scheme Congress adopted in the
TVPA to combat human trafficking, it seems clear that Congress intended
the TVPA (and particularly § 1589) to do most of the work in human trafficking prosecutions. True, most prosecutors would likely still charge both
offenses,144 but it seems unlikely that Congress’s intent in passing § 1589 was
simply to create a frequently duplicative penalty that might be useful in
prosecutors’ plea bargaining negotiations. Using § 1589 merely to enhance
the government’s bargaining position sends the message that the TVPA is
not sufficient on its own and suggests that it is unnecessary because human
trafficking is just common criminal activity punishable by general federal
statutes.
In the face of the dire threat human trafficking presents in our society,
some may ask why courts should favor an interpretation that protects at
least some human traffickers from the possibility of a life sentence that
§ 1201(a) provides. But there is good reason to believe that, despite our best
intentions, the impulse to magnify punishments in response to our fear of
crime does not reflect humanity’s best judgment.145 Where Congress has
chosen not to give in to that fear and to design what it believes to be a
rationally tiered system of punishment for human trafficking, courts should
not second-guess that judgment. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle of
American criminal justice that no man should be deprived of his liberty by
disregarding his rights, even if he is charged with the most egregious of
crimes.146 As the next Section reveals, a broad interpretation of § 1201(a)
majorly threatens those rights.
143. Life in prison is the second-most extreme sanction in the criminal system, the most
extreme sanction being the death penalty.
144. There are many occasions in which prosecutors will indict a defendant on many
counts of a single crime (horizontal overcharging) or many crimes (vertical overcharging) in
the hopes of inducing a plea bargain to a few or one of those charges in exchange for the
dismissal of the others. Albert A. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 50, 85–90 (1968). Prosecutors may also adopt those strategies to create a safety
net at trial, hoping that even if the jury does not convict on the kidnapping charge, it would
still convict on a forced labor charge. Cf. id. at 93 (indicating that many prosecutors like to
“play it safe” when it comes to charging because unknown factual circumstances may arise
after jeopardy has attached).
145. See Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s OneWay Criminal Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 408, 427–44 (2011); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 529–69 (2001).
146. See Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (reaffirming that despite the need for confessions in criminal cases, the rights of defendants must still be protected in the interrogation
room). As the Supreme Court famously expounded:
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society’s need for interrogation outweighs the privilege. . . . The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that
the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the
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C. A Broad Reading of § 1201(A) Violates the Due Process Rights of
Potential Defendants in a Way the TVPA Was Designed to Avoid
As the Kozminski decision clearly demonstrates, ambiguity in criminal
statutes is problematic from a due process perspective and raises significant
constitutional questions. The Supreme Court has made clear that the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment (for federal statutes) and the Fourteenth Amendment (for state statutes) render a criminal statute void where
“men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”147 One key reason for this protection is that citizens
have a right to reasonable notice of what criminal law prohibits.148
Vague statutes also tend to sweep too broadly so as to include “activities
which by modern standards are normally innocent.”149 Moreover, vague
criminal statutes are problematic because of “the unfettered discretion
[they] place in the hands of the . . . police.”150
Where . . . there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion
granted by the ordinance, [a vague statute] permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for “harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting
officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.”151

power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged. . . .
“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected
to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperilled [sic] if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. . . . To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means . . . would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court
should resolutely set its face.”

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479–80 (1966) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); cf., e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”); 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *352 (“[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer.”); D. Graham Burnett, A Trial by Jury 163–64 (2001) (“I think that we all understand why [the burden of proof is so great]: to protect citizens from the . . . tremendous power
of the state. . . . [T]rue justice, final justice, absolute justice, belongs to God; human justice can
only be cautious, not perfect. For this reason is the burden so heavy.”).
147. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Note, however, that courts
did not, in many early cases, tie void-for-vagueness decisions to specific parts of the Constitution. See Ralph W. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 831 (1923).
148. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
149. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972).
150. Id. at 168.
151. Id. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940)).

298

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:275

Therefore, although the “void for vagueness” doctrine does not require a
legislature to speak with perfect clarity152 and is not employed merely because hypothetical cases are difficult to classify,153 it does provide a meaningful restriction on the powers of elected legislatures and executives.
These concerns are implicated by the interpretations of § 1201(a)
adopted by some circuits. For example, an uncle in Ohio, in order to “induce” his nephew to come with him to Michigan, might falsely promise a
hunting trip, knowing that the child’s parents had a surprise birthday party
waiting for his nephew there. Under an interpretation of § 1201(a) that allows holding by deception with no requirement that the uncle be willing to
back up that deception by force,154 it is unclear if the uncle would be guilty
of kidnapping. Of course, one can hardly imagine any federal prosecutor
who would bring that case—or any FBI agent willing to charge it—but that
is precisely the point: the enforcement of the statute is left completely to the
arbitrary and potentially discriminatory discretion of law enforcement. Thus
the Eighth and Fifth Circuits’ interpretations, as well as the Lentz court’s
methodology, raise serious constitutional doubts about § 1201(a) from a
due process perspective.155
Even in cases that are not so innocent, defendants have a constitutional
right to know what conduct is prohibited by a criminal statute.156 The constitutional doubts created by this ambiguity endanger the convictions of kidnappers in jurisdictions that do not impose the Eleventh Circuit’s specific
intent requirement. Given that many traffickers employ psychological coercion, those jurisdictions without an intent requirement may be particularly
vulnerable to challenges on these grounds.157
If these concerns look familiar, it is because they are precisely the same
concerns the Supreme Court raised in Kozminski when it determined the
proper meaning of the word “hold” in a different context.158 As in that case,
Congress has the power to remedy these concerns in order to allow courts to
confidently sanction human traffickers. And, it did, in the TVPA.159 Congress’s decision to take that step in the TVPA rather than through § 1201(a)
is a compelling reason not to interpret § 1201(a) broadly. Through the
TVPA, Congress provided a means of protecting due process rights while
152. See LaFave, supra note 118, § 2.3(a).
153. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 303 (2008) (“The ‘mere fact that one can
conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’ ” (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984))); accord United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32
(1963); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).
154. And one would hope that an uncle would not be willing to apply physical force in
order to get a child to attend his or her own birthday party.
155. See supra notes 147–153 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
157. See generally Kim, supra note 2 (describing the legal function of psychological coercion in modern-day slavery).
158. See supra Section I.B.2.
159. See supra Section I.B.2.
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still combating human trafficking; the role of the courts is to give life to that
scheme, not to allow prosecutors to strangle it by circumvention.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that “where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, [a court’s] duty is to adopt the latter.”160 This rule of construction,
known as constitutional avoidance, applies not only in cases in which one
interpretation of a statute would render it unconstitutional, but also where a
construction raises serious questions about whether it might do so.161 “[I]t
represents [a] judicial policy . . . [a] judgment that statutes ought not to
tread on questionable constitutional grounds unless they do so clearly, or
perhaps a judgment that courts should minimize the occasions on which
they confront and perhaps contradict the legislative branch.”162 And while
this rule has been criticized,163 it is undoubtedly settled law.164 Here, the
interpretation articulated by the Eighth and Fifth Circuits, as well as that
developed by the Lentz court, raises significant constitutional due process
questions, whereas the interpretation adopted by the Eleventh Circuit does
not.165 Accordingly, the constitutional avoidance canon directs that courts
should adopt the latter.
D. Ambiguity in § 1201(a) Leads to Confused Human
Trafficking Enforcement
The law places a high premium on certainty and clarity in most fields,166
but those concerns are particularly acute in criminal law. The lack of clarity
in criminal laws may lead to arbitrary enforcement by law enforcement officials, who have inadequate guidance as to what conduct is prohibited.167 Furthermore, uncertainty over when the law allows the police to intervene may
160. United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407–08
(1909).
161. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (“It is our settled policy to avoid an
interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.”); Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at
247–48 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
162. Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 249.
163. E.g., Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 211–12 (1967); Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 815–16 (1983).
164. Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 249–50.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 154–157.
166. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921)) (purpose of following precedent is certainty); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (purpose of doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel is certainty/clarity); Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and
Perillo on Contracts § 3.2(b) (6th ed. 2009) (purpose of the parol evidence rule is certainty and clarity); Joseph William Singer, Property § 11.3.2 (4th ed. 2014) (purpose of the
Statute of Frauds is certainty).
167. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347–54 (2001) (explaining the
special need for clarity in criminal procedure rules involving investigations—such as searches
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lead officers to hesitate in action, endangering public safety.168 Thus, despite
the fact that legislatures frequently pass vague or loosely worded criminal
statutes that delegate important enforcement decisions to prosecutors,169 the
vast amount of discretion this creates often leads to undesirable results.170
The concerns raised by vague criminal laws are clearly illustrated in the
human trafficking context when prosecutors have demonstrated marked uncertainty regarding their ability to prosecute cases in which physical coercion
is not present.171 In one instance, a federal prosecutor argued that prosecution was impossible when faced with a ring of traffickers who brought
women to the United States from Korea and intimidated them into providing commercial sex services.172 The prosecutor explained his decision by emphasizing that the coercion involved—employer intimidation and cultural
isolation that led the women to believe they had no choice but to submit—
was entirely within the victims’ minds.173 This case illustrates the sort of
confusion statutory ambiguity can create regarding the psychological coercion inherent in many human trafficking cases. This confusion is amplified
when the kidnapping statute is also at issue. Uncertainty on the part of law
enforcement and prosecutors consequently endangers the already vulnerable
victims of human trafficking, who laws like the TVPA are designed to protect. After all, prosecutors who are confused as to how to prove their cases
may simply decide not to bring them.
Similar confusion exists when drugs are used to facilitate human trafficking. Consider a recent incident in which “recruiters” from a Florida farm
induced members of vulnerable populations, such as the homeless and those
already addicted to crack cocaine, to travel to their farm.174 Once there, the
farm owners used a combination of debt and crack cocaine to keep workers
in perpetual peonage.175 LeRoy Smith, a man with only a fifth-grade education who had been previously “trolling Atlanta’s gay district” and trading
and seizures—because of the pressures police officers face on a daily basis); City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60–64 (1999).
168. One can easily draw this conclusion from the confusion surrounding attempted
crimes in which a lack of clarity concerning when police can intervene has tied up courts for
years and thus creates problems with training law enforcement officers about when they can or
cannot intervene in the interest of public safety. See LaFave, supra note 118, §§ 11.2(b), 11.4
(explaining that the purpose of attempt law is to allow police to intervene prior to the commission of a crime and discussing the confusion created by the multiplicity of approaches
adopted by courts to determine when intervention can occur).
169. Stuntz, supra note 145, at 546–57.
170. Kim, supra note 2, at 969. For example, prosecutors may fail to bring charges due to
uncertainty surrounding the elements of the charges. Id.
171.
172.
173.
174.
2012, at
175.
cocaine,

Id. at 970–72.
Id. at 971–72.
Id. at 972.
Ben Montgomery, Drugs, Debt Bind Laborers in Slavery, Tampa Bay Times, May 13,
1A.
Id. Specifically workers would be induced to take out loans to pay for food and crack
which their “wages” would never be able to pay back. Id.
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sexual acts for crack, was able to simply slip away from the farm in the
night.176 In his words, “[t]he only reason there’s no shackles is because now
they make the people submit to the cocaine. That’s what they use to basically control the people.”177
This case beautifully illustrates the ambiguity created by the current split
in authority, because it is unclear whether the Florida recruiters could be
convicted of kidnapping. Smith mentioned no physical abuse, stated that
cocaine, rather than physical restraint, was the sole means used to control
the victims,178 and was apparently able to slip away without much difficulty.
These factors suggest that the farm owners might not be willing to use force
to detain a worker who wanted to leave. At the very least, there is a colorable
argument to that effect. Whereas the rationales adopted by the Eighth and
Fifth Circuits and the Lentz court could support charges based solely on this
information, law enforcement operating under the reasoning of the Eleventh
Circuit or the Higgs court might need more evidence.179 This sort of uncertainty could cause a prosecutor to elect not to charge a case, or to delay in
order to gather more evidence (allowing the harms experienced by victims
to multiply along the way).
Even if prosecutors do not hesitate to bring charges, uncertainty in the
legal standard jeopardizes convictions to the extent it obscures the elements
the government must satisfy. Moreover, § 1201(a) imposes the stiffest penalties of all the statutes frequently used to prosecute human traffickers.180 Accordingly, ambiguities in its interpretation may cause these enforcement
difficulties to be more acute, because law enforcement officers may wait until they have gathered enough evidence to obtain a kidnapping conviction
before making any arrests.
Of course, these problems do not necessarily suggest that § 1201(a)
must be interpreted narrowly, rather they only indicate that the ambiguity
should be settled one way or the other. While enforcement uncertainty does
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Assuming, for the moment, that cocaine itself could not be counted as physical force
so long as the workers use it voluntarily.
179. It is true that prosecutors and law enforcement officers could probably proceed
under other federal statutes, such as the forced labor statute modified by the TVPA. See 18
U.S.C. § 1589 (2012). But, especially in circumstances as egregious as this, law enforcement
and prosecutors have an incentive to try to maximize the charges they can bring against defendants. Additionally, they may still hesitate in order to try and gather sufficient evidence to
charge under the kidnapping statute. See id. § 1201(a). This effect will occur only at the margins. For those who might die from an overdose on crack cocaine in the meantime, however,
marginal effects could literally become a matter of life and death.
180. See Hyland, supra note 11, at 48–49 (listing the typical charges brought by prosecutors against human traffickers). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (defining kidnapping and providing
for a penalty of up to life in prison), with id. § 1581 (defining peonage and setting a maximum
penalty of twenty years unless certain other crimes are involved), and id. § 1584 (defining sale
into involuntary servitude and setting a maximum penalty of twenty years unless a kidnapping
is involved), and id. § 1589 (defining forced labor and setting a maximum penalty of twenty
years unless other crimes such as kidnapping or murder are involved).
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show how the split over the meaning of § 1201(a) hinders the effectiveness
of the TVPA, it does not indicate the best way to reconcile these two statutes.
The problems discussed in this Section do, however, indicate why the resolution of this circuit split is so critical—the preceding sections make clear how
that should be done.
IV. Other Traditional Methods of Statutory Interpretation
Also Support a Narrow Reading of Section 1201(a)
Part III demonstrated that adopting the narrow interpretation of
§ 1201(a) favored by the Eleventh Circuit is necessary in order to effectively
reconcile § 1201(a) with the TVPA. This Part concludes this Note’s analysis
by suggesting that other traditional forms of statutory construction also
favor the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation. Section IV.A determines that the
plain text of § 1201(a) suggests that it should be read narrowly. Section IV.B
argues that the legislative history of § 1201(a) supports this conclusion. Section IV.C points to at least one additional strand of Supreme Court precedent that favors the Eleventh Circuit’s § 1201(a) approach.
A. The Text of the Kidnapping Statute Supports Requiring an
Intent to Hold by Force or Threat
Any question involving the proper construction of an arguably ambiguous statute begins with the statute’s text.181 “The words of a statute . . . are to
be taken in their natural . . . and ordinary signification and import . . . .”182
Accordingly, the first place to look for guidance as to the meaning of “hold”
in the context of § 1201(a) is in a dictionary.183 To “hold” something or
someone as used in contexts similar to the wording of § 1201(a),184 generally
means: “to have possession or ownership of or have at one’s disposal,” “to
keep under restraint,” “to have or maintain in the grasp,” or “to prevent
from leaving or getting away.”185 What unites this series of definitions is the
181. Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 16. Indeed, some scholars (and jurists) think
that the inquiry should not only begin with the text, but also end there. Id. at 16–18; cf. John
F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1997) (arguing
that the use of legislative history impermissibly empowers a subset of Congress). But cf. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845,
863–64 (1992) (arguing that legislative history is a necessary tool to understand the meaning
of a statute). This Note takes no position on this debate as it contends that both textualist and
purposivist readings of § 1201(a) compel the same interpretation.
182. 1 James Kent, Commentaries *462.
183. Judges often view dictionaries as excellent indicators of the so-called common or
ordinary sense of a word. See, e.g., Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 70, 415–24.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (“Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps,
abducts, or carries away and holds . . . any person . . . . shall be punished . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
185. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 592 (11th ed. 2003). It is important
to acknowledge that § 1201(a) was originally adopted in 1932, An Act Forbidding the Transportation of Any Person in Interstate or Foreign Commerce, Kidnaped, or Otherwise Unlawfully Detained, and Making Such Act a Felony (Lindbergh Kidnapping Act), Pub. L. No. 72-
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idea that the exercise of control must be such that the object or person to be
controlled is not perfectly free to leave. It is a stretch to apply that definition
when an alleged kidnapper had no intention to use force or threats to back
up the deception he has employed to induce a victim to accompany him.
On the other hand, these definitions do not explicitly preclude consideration of deception as a means of exercising such control, leaving the statute
at least arguably ambiguous. Moreover, the statute itself mentions “decoy”
and “inveiglement” as means of gaining control.186 So, critics might ask, why
should we presume the legislature did not also intend them to satisfy the
holding requirement?187 Responding to this argument requires looking to
two canons of construction: (1) the conjunctive/disjunctive canon, and (2)
the rule against surplusage.
First, it is a common rule of both law and grammar that the word “and”
in a conjunctive list of elements typically separates two or more distinct
elements that must both be met.188 In their recent treatise on textualism,
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner describe Office Max, Inc. v. United States189
as an example of the proper application of this canon.190 There, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that, because the statute allowed a tax only where “there is
a toll charge which varies in amount with the distance and elapsed transmission time of each individual communication,”191 Office Max could not be
taxed on a service whose price varied only based on one of these elements.192
In the case of § 1201(a), both a taking—whether in the form of a physical abduction or an “inveigle[ment]” or a “decoy[ ]”—and a holding must
occur.193 This suggests that the word “holds” creates a separate requirement,
above and beyond the decoy or inveiglement used to gain control of the victim. Moreover, “holds” occurs outside of the disjunctive list containing

189, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1201), and words do change
meaning over time, see, e.g., James Bradstreet Greenough & George Lyman Kittredge,
Words and Their Ways in English Speech 234–59 (1901). Accordingly, most textualists
insist that the only way to properly explore ordinary meaning is to examine dictionaries from
the time the statute was framed; some even go so far as to provide a comprehensive listing of
“good” dictionaries to use for each time period. E.g., Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at
78–92, 415–24. Absent any indication that the definition of the word “hold” has shifted radically since the 1930s, however, a lexicographic examination of slight changes in its meaning (if
any) is beyond the scope of this Note, particularly because it is likely to turn up nothing of
relevance to the process of interpretation.
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
187. But see infra notes 202–203 and accompanying text.
188. Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 116–19.
189. 428 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2005).
190. Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 117–19.
191. 26 U.S.C. § 4252(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
192. Office Max, Inc., 428 F.3d at 588–92.
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012).

304

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:275

“decoys” and “inveigles,”194 so they are not meant to provide clarification to
the meaning of “holds.”195
Second, the rule against surplusage directs that “courts must . . . lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make some idle and nugatory.”196 In other words, “[b]ecause
legal drafters should not include words that have no effect, courts avoid a
reading that renders some words altogether redundant.”197 Here, if the same
deception that satisfied the first, “taking,” element of section 1201(a) also
satisfied the second, “holding,” element it would render the latter wholly
irrelevant. One who kidnaps a victim by physical force or threats has clearly
done something beyond applying the initial force necessary to “take” his
victim. With each passing second, the kidnapper continues to apply force to
“hold” the victim. The same does not necessarily follow where the victim is
“taken” by deception; the alleged kidnaper may do or say nothing additional
to the victim once he enters the vehicle or agrees to come along. Absent a
metaphysical consideration of the deception as a continuing act, which
would seem to wholly vitiate any conception of taking and holding as separate elements,198 the alleged kidnapper has done nothing beyond the initial
taking. Hence the broad holdings of the Hoog and Carrion-Caliz courts cannot be reconciled with the text of § 1201(a).
Of course, the Eleventh Circuit is undoubtedly right to hold that a kidnapper should not be allowed to escape conviction “[w]here an inveiglement
occurs and force is held in reserve only because the kidnapper’s deception is
operating successfully.”199 After all, statutes should not be construed so as to
cause an absurd result.200 But, that is not to say that nothing should be required in addition to the deception. This is precisely why the Eleventh Circuit reached the correct conclusion when it required proof of a specific
194. Separated as noted previously by the word “and.”
195. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 117–19. Thus, the traditional canon noscitur a sociis—which holds that where words “are associated in a context suggesting that [they]
have something in common, they should be assigned a permissible meaning that makes them
similar,” id. at 195, and especially that “words grouped in a list should be given related meanings,” id. (quoting Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977))—
does not apply, because “hold” falls outside the list containing “decoys” and “inveigles.”
196. See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which
Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 58 (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1999) (1868).
197. Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 176 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207 n.53
(1985); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979); and Burdon Cent. Sugar Ref. Co.
v. Payne, 167 U.S. 127, 142 (1897)); accord United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)
(“These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used.”).
198. To briefly expand on this point, to say that the original deception can—as a “continuing act”—satisfy both the taking and the holding requirements, is to read one or the other
out of the statute, because that they are separate element suggests that the word “hold” must
add something that the taking requirement alone does not convey.
199. United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
200. See, e.g., Cernauskas v. Fletcher, 201 S.W.2d 999, 1000 (Ark. 1947) (reading “in conflict herewith” into an act that repeals “[a]ll laws and parts of laws”); Grey v. Pearson, (1857)
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intent to use force or threats to back up a ruse in kidnapping-by-deception
cases.201 That interpretation provides a reasonable understanding of the statute that avoids both absurdity and reading the “holding” requirement into
oblivion. The alternative formulation offered by the Lentz court, requiring
only the opportunity to use force, does not meet these criteria. That standard would require nothing beyond physical proximity between the alleged
defendant and the alleged victim.
Finally, if there is any remaining ambiguity after the exhaustion of the
traditional textual methods of statutory interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that a criminal statute must be interpreted in favor of the defendant.202
In this case, then, the rule of lenity favors a narrow interpretation:203 as a
matter of textual interpretation, § 1201(a) requires an intention to use force
or threats to back up a deceptive taking.
B. The History and Purpose of § 1201(a) Provide Support
for this Narrower Reading
Congress intended § 1201(a) to supplement, rather than replace, state
kidnapping statutes. Its intent was to provide a remedy for the administrative conflicts that often occurred when kidnappers crossed state lines and
thus required coordination between the law enforcement agencies of other
states. This history and purpose, though it does not directly speak to the
definition of kidnapping, at least counsels caution when an interpretation
would greatly expand federal jurisdiction.
On March 1, 1932, the infant son of Charles and Anne Lindbergh204 was
kidnapped in what was, at the time, referred to as the “crime of the century.”205 Tragically, the child’s body was found in the woods only a few miles
from his parents’ home; however, the case still triggered national concern
over the way “conflicting state laws forced the authorities to conform an
otherwise national manhunt to the particular idiosyncrasies of each state
10 Eng. Rep. 1216 (H.L.) 1234; 6 H.L.C. 61, 106 (“[I]n construing wills and indeed statutes,
and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered
to, unless that would lead to some absurdity.”); 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *60
(discussing how the ancient law that “whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished
with the utmost severity” did not apply to surgeons).
201. Boone, 959 F.2d at 1555.
202. Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 296–302; see also Moskal v. United States, 498
U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (indicating that the rule of lenity is only applied “after resort to ‘the
language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the statute” (quoting
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980))).
203. For this rule to apply, one must be persuaded that the plain text of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a) (2012) is ambiguous at all.
204. Lindbergh had by this time become a national celebrity as a result of his nonstop
flight from New York to Paris using a monoplane named the “Spirit of St. Louis.” See generally
A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh (1998).
205. M. Todd Scott, Comment, Kidnapping Federalism: United States v. Wills and the Constitutionality of Extending Federal Criminal Law into the States, 93 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
753, 753–54 (2003).
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into which it extended.”206 Testimony before the House Committee on the
Judiciary revealed that of the 279 kidnappings which took place in 1931,
prosecutors only secured sixty-nine convictions, and that in at least fortyfour of these cases the kidnapper crossed state lines.207 Kidnapping, at that
time, had become something of a growth industry for organized criminals,
who would often kidnap a victim in one state and take the victim across
state lines precisely because it would create jurisdictional problems.208
The Lindbergh Law (which would eventually become § 1201(a)) was
meant to provide a federal solution to these problems.209 Yet even at the time
of passage, there were grave concerns about infringing too greatly on the
traditional jurisdiction of the states; after all, kidnapping was already a crime
in every state.210 Indeed, the House version of the bill initially called for a
plan that would allow the governor of a state and the U.S. Department of
Justice to deputize state law enforcement personnel to act extrajurisdictionally in such cases rather than rely on federal law enforcement officers.211
Although this plan obviously did not prevail, partly because it would occasion delay in pursuing kidnappers212 and might have caused the bill’s defeat,213 among other reasons,214 it still demonstrates a hesitation to expand
federal jurisdiction too far.
In 1934, Congress amended § 1201(a) so that a person who was not
released by his kidnappers within seven days would be presumed to have
traveled in interstate commerce.215 Though this action expanded federal jurisdiction, it is worth noting that the Senate had originally suggested that the
presumption attach after three days, so the amendment adopted was a careful compromise between expanded state and federal authority.216
206. Id.
207. Forbidding the Transportation of Any Person or Persons in Interstate or Foreign Commerce, Kidnaped or Otherwise Unlawfully Detained: Hearing on H.R. 5657 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 72nd Cong. 5 (1932) (statement of Cleveland A. Newton); Horace L. Bomar,
Jr., The Lindbergh Law, 1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 435, 435 (1934).
208. Barry Cushman, Headline Kidnappings and the Origins of the Lindbergh Law, 55 St.
Louis U. L.J. 1293, 1294–95 (2011). For instance, such action put them beyond the jurisdiction of the police in the state of abduction, and witnesses in the state of destination were
beyond the subpoena powers of those police as well. Id.
209. Scott, supra note 205, at 753–54; see Britenae M. Coates, Comment, The Fourth Circuit’s New Interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping Act in United States v. Wills and the Resulting Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 2041, 2044–46 & n.20 (2002).
210. Bomar, supra note 207, at 435–37.
211. Id. at 436–37.
212. 75 Cong. Rec. 13,288 (1932) (statement of Rep. Andrew J. Montague).
213. See 75 Cong. Rec. 13,299.
214. Bomar, supra note 207, at 437.
215. Diana M. Concannon, Kidnapping: An Investigator’s Guide to Profiling 13
(2008).
216. Bomar, supra note 207, at 440.
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The current version of the statute, after codification and more than
eighty years of tweaking, attaches the presumption after twenty-four hours217
and includes a number of additional jurisdictional hooks.218 It is undoubtedly true that this evolution reflects incremental expansion of federal jurisdiction over kidnapping, but what Congress chose not to do is far more
telling. Since 1932, the federal commerce power 219 has expanded to such an
extent that Congress could almost certainly provide for plenary federal jurisdiction over kidnapping cases.220 It has not done so, and has instead elected
to only gradually expand § 1201(a)’s reach.
Though it is dangerous to draw conclusions from legislative inaction,221
the heavy consideration of states’ rights at the Lindbergh Law’s inception
and the slow and incremental method of expansion Congress has adopted
since then at least caution against a judicial interpretation that would sweep
a large amount of activity within the scope of § 1201(a).
C. A Specific Intent Requirement Better Comports with Supreme Court
Precedent Regarding Comprehensive Legislative Enactments
Though the Supreme Court has not addressed § 1201(a) since Chatwin,
its precedents are not completely silent on the meaning of the word “hold”
in this context.222
Beyond the ordinary principle that statutes should not be interpreted in
isolation, that the TVPA provides a comprehensive scheme for addressing
human trafficking should preclude a broad interpretation of “hold” in
§ 1201(a). In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court
found the FDA’s determination that it had jurisdiction over tobacco under
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2012). The presumption only attaches, however, if the jurisdictional hook claimed is transportation in interstate or foreign commerce (§ 1201(a)(1)). See id.
218. See supra note 102.
219. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
220. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (“Our case law firmly establishes Congress’
power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 152 (1971))); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (“That appellee’s own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that
of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”).
221. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (“[C]ongressional inaction [often]
lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from
such inaction . . . .” (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994))); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption,
83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441, 1444–48 (2008) (describing the numerous barriers to congressional action and concluding that “[t]he obvious consequence of the vetogates structure is that
federal statutes are hard to enact”). In fact, some argue that it is dangerous to draw conclusions even from legislative history itself. E.g., Scalia & Garner, supra note 121, at 369–90.
222. Indeed, Chatwin could be read as militating against the interpretations adopted by
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. See Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946) (“Nothing indicates that [the girl] was deprived of her liberty . . . . [She was] perfectly free to leave.”).
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the Pure Food and Drug Act was unreasonable because Congress had enacted a comprehensive set of statutes to govern tobacco products
elsewhere.223
Similarly, Congress created a comprehensive scheme in the TVPA to
combat human trafficking, covering prevention, protection and victim assistance, and prosecution.224 Therefore, by deferring to Congress’s comprehensive scheme for regulating human trafficking and reading § 1201(a) of the
federal kidnapping statute narrowly, courts would allow the TVPA to work
the way Congress designed it. By adopting a narrow interpretation of
§ 1201(a), courts would provide clear guidance to prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and criminal defendants regarding what conduct is prohibited, what elements must be satisfied, and what punishments courts are
likely to impose. These consequences provide compelling support for the
Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation.
Conclusion
The confusion surrounding the meaning of the word “hold” in
§ 1201(a) has avoided attention largely because many traditional kidnapping
cases stem from situations in which a willingness to use force is not seriously
in dispute. Human trafficking changes that analysis. Through the TVPA, the
United States became one of the first countries in the world to address
human trafficking in a comprehensive way. Reading § 1201(a) broadly has
the potential to create a conflict with the TVPA that renders substantial portions of the TVPA superfluous, dilutes its moral force, and raises the very
due process concerns Congress sought to avoid in drafting § 1589. Even if
adopting a narrow interpretation means that some human traffickers will
face lower maximum sentences, failing to do so would be a step backward.
Adopting a broader or intermediate interpretation would undermine the
will of Congress, infringe on the rights of defendants, undercut respect for
the TVPA and its critical place in the global fight against traffickers, and,
most importantly, represent a failure to consider how human trafficking can
and should influence the way we think about criminal law.

223. 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511–14,
527–32 (2007) (recognizing that the principle set forth in Brown & Williamson was valid, but
declining to find a comprehensive legislative response with regards to climate change).
224. Hyland, supra note 11, at 62; see also supra Section I.B.1.

